44 ideas
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| 22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| 22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
| 4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
| 4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
| 4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
| 4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
| 4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| 22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
| 22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
| 22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| 22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| 22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| 22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |